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Although cash pooling arrangements are one of the most important tools to facilitate efficient liquidity management within multinational
enterprises (MNEs or group companies), the application of the arm’s length principle to these arrangements has not been sufficiently explored as yet.
Against this background, this article critically discusses the transfer pricing aspects of physical cash pooling arrangements, especially in the light of
the OECD’s recent Discussion Draft on Financial Transactions. Specifically, the article discusses the application of the arm’s length principle to
cash pooling borrowings and deposits, guarantees issued in the context of the pooling arrangement, remuneration of the cash pool leader (CPL) as
well as allocation of the cash pool benefit, in particular, the netting benefit and the volume discount. The authors also provide comments on the
impact of the negative interest rate environment on cash pooling arrangements.
1 INTRODUCTION
Even if cash pooling arrangements are considered to be
one of the most significant tools to facilitate liquidity
management within MNEs,1 the application of the arm’s
length principle to cash pooling transactions is neverthe-
less subject to intense discussions with the tax
administration.2 One main reason is that cash pooling
transactions are usually not found between independent
enterprises.3 Thus, it is difficult to establish arm’s length
transfer prices for cash pooling transactions between group
companies. Accordingly, the question arises regarding
how to approach such arrangements for transfer pricing
purposes. This question can generally be answered from
two different angles, namely from a transactional angle or
on the basis of a clear reflection of income approach4 (or
combinations thereof),5 taking into consideration the par-
ticular characteristics of cash pooling arrangements. This
article critically discusses the application of the arm’s
length principle to physical cash pooling transactions
based on the former approach.
After an introduction to the background and character-
istics of physical cash pooling arrangements and the chal-
lenges in applying the arm’s length principle to them
(section 2), the article discusses the application of the
arm’s length principle to various transactions found in
the arrangement, such as short-term funding transactions
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1 PwC, Clarifying the Rules: Sustainable Transfer Pricing in the Financial Services Sector 137 (PwC Apr. 2012).
2 K. Łukosz, A. Ursu & M. Druga, Transfer Pricing of Intra-Group Cash-Pooling Arrangements Through the Lens of Business and Economic Reality, 25(3) Int’l Transfer Pricing J. 208
(2018); V. Chand, Transfer Pricing Aspects of Cash Pooling Arrangements in Light of the BEPS Action Plan, 23(1) Int’l Transfer Pricing J. 38–47 (2016).
3 OECD, Discussion Draft, BEPS Actions 8-10: Financial Transactions, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, para. 100 (OECD Publishing 3 July 2018); H. M.
Andresen, N. Pearson-Wood & H-M. Jørgensen, ConocoPhillips Case: Implications in Norway and Beyond, 17(6) Int’l Transfer Pricing J. 464 (2010); E. Vistisen, Bombardier
Case: First Published Cash Pool Decision, 21(3) Int’l Transfer Pricing J. 189 (2014).
4 From a holistic perspective, cash pooling arrangements could be regarded as pooling of balances as part of a short-term liquidity management arrangement. OECD, supra n.
3, para. 101. They could therefore be more than the consolidation of (single) account balances of group companies. The arm’s length analysis could correspondingly focus on
the cash pooling arrangement as a whole, rather than on the single transactions it combines. By contrast, from a transactional perspective, cash pooling could also be seen as a
combination of single transactions between group companies. By applying a transactional approach, the arm’s length analysis could therefore focus on pricing the single
transactions between the group companies to ensure an arm’s length allocation of income and expenses between the associated enterprises.
5 A difference exists between a transactional approach and clear reflection of income approaches vis-à-vis transfer pricing. A transactional approach is based on the assumption
that if transactional pricing is at arm’s length, the overall allocation of income and expenses between the relevant group companies will be appropriate. By contrast, clear
reflection of income approaches refer to any type of aggregate assessment of contributions of the respective group companies. Such approaches could range from different
types of profit split analyses, to formalized contribution analysis, to formulary apportionment in various forms. R. S. Collier & J. L. Andrus, Transfer Pricing and the Arm’s
Length Principle After BEPS 102–05 (Oxford U. Press 2017).
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(section 3), cash pool guarantees (section 4), the remunera-
tion of the CPL (section 5) and the allocation of cash pool
benefits (section 6). It also examines the general implica-
tions of the low or even negative interest rate environment
on physical cash pooling arrangements (section 7).
Notably, this article focuses on a detailed technical ana-
lysis of various issues at stake in the physical pooling
arrangement. The authors’ views on each issue are
included in each section of the article.
2 PHYSICAL CASH POOLING
2.1 Introduction
It is a well-established fact that the cost of external funding
for MNEs had increased substantially due to the financial
crisis. In order to reduce such costs, MNEs had to rethink
their cash management strategies. One such strategy was to
implement cash pools.6 By establishing a cash pool, MNEs
can manage the liquidity requirements of the group on a
consolidated basis (virtually or physically) by concentrating
the cash of the group companies (cash pool members) in one
place, i.e. in the master account of the CPL (typically a
finance or treasury company (TCo) of the group). The general
effect of cash pooling is that the MNE pays or receives
interest only on the net (consolidated) cash amount of the
master account. Apart from the fact that cash pooling can
significantly reduce external funding costs, cash pooling can
also create several other benefits such as enhanced credit
terms and reduced transaction costs.7
More specifically, in a physical cash pool (different to a
notional cash pool),8 the surplus cash of the cash pool
members is transferred (usually daily or weekly) to the
master account owned by the CPL. Surplus liabilities are
thus correspondingly eliminated by transferring funds
from the master account. Each bank account is brought
to target balance (usually zero). Due to the physical cash
transfer, the ownership of cash changes with the effect of
establishing (intercompany) financial arrangements
between the CPL and the cash pool members.9 The fol-
lowing simplified example illustrates the functioning of
physical cash pooling arrangement:
A parent company (PCo) has three subsidiaries, namely
SCo 1, SCo 2 and SCo 3. Each subsidiary has an external
bank account. SCo1 and SCo 2 show a positive balance of
EUR 200 and EUR 150, respectively, whereas SCo3 has a
negative balance of 100. The interest rates offered by the
external banks are 10% (SCo1 and SCo2) and 15% (SCo3).
PCo decides to establish a TCo. TCo concludes a physical
cash pool arrangement with Bank Y that sets up the cash
pool. The interest rates applied by Bank Y on the master
account are more favourable than the interest rates offered
to the single group companies due to economies of scale,
i.e. 12% (positive balance) and 14% (negative balance).
The total cash pool benefit is calculated as follows:
Stand-alone transaction
(without pooling)
Cash
Pooling
Total
cash
pool
benefit
SCo1 SCo2 SCo3 Total
Balance 200 150 –100 250 250
Interest
rate (%) 10% 10% 15% 12%
Interest 20 15 –15 20 30 10
This example shows that, through the establishment of
a physical cash pool, the group can significantly
enhance its interest income and reduce the cost of
funding cash shortfalls. With pooling, the (consoli-
dated) interest income can be increased to EUR 30.
Thus, the total benefit from establishment of the cash
pool (the cash pool benefit) is EUR 10 (30–20).
Furthermore, the establishment of the cash pool could
potentially create benefits that would not be available
to the single cash-pooling participant without the cash
pool, such as a ‘volume discount’ (i.e. better credit
terms due to economies of scale).
Additionally, in a physical cash pool, the CPL may
perform a broad set of functions. Prior scholarly litera-
ture on this topic distinguishes between two extreme
ends of such a spectrum of functions.10 On the one
hand, a CPL could be a (low-risk) financial service pro-
vider. In this situation, the CPL usually conducts activ-
ities related to the daily execution of the cash pool, such
as the assurance of the daily cash transfers, the calcula-
tion of the interest expense and the issuance of reports on
the cash positions of the cash pool members.11 On the
other hand, the CPL could function as an ‘internal bank’.
In this situation, the CPL assumes higher strategic
Notes
6 PwC, supra n. 1, at 137.
7 A. Russo & O. Moerer, Introduction, in Transfer Pricing and Intra-Group Financing 44 (A. Bakker & M. M. Levey eds, IBFD 2012); ibid.
8 In a notional arrangement, each cash pool member generally maintains its credit or debt position on its own bank accounts. The accounts are not physically balanced by the
master account. By contrast, the bank creates a notional or shadow position (virtual master account) and charges or pays interest on the consolidated amount. S. Hillman,
Notional vs. Physical Cash Pooling Revisited, Int’l Treasurer (Feb. 2011).
9 A. J. Bakker, Transfer Pricing and Intra-group Financing: Low Hanging Fruit?, 15(2) Derivatives & Fin. Instruments 30 (2013).
10 R. Petruzzi, Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intra-Group Financing 145, 146 (Wolters Kluwer 2016); Russo & Moerer, supra n. 7, at 45; Chand, supra n. 2, at 39.
11 Russo & Moerer, supra n. 7, at 45.
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(valuable) functions.12 The CPL could indeed be in the
position to decide on major issues such as liquidity
planning in the group and complete internalization of
the cash accounts of the cash pooling members.13 It may
also negotiate with the banks and, correspondingly, take
all relevant decisions with regard to external (short-term)
funding, portfolio strategies (e.g. hedging or investment
of surplus cash) and the internal allocation of (short-
term) cash on the basis of the specific needs of the
group companies.14
2.2 Challenges in Applying the Arm’s Length
Principle to Physical Cash Pooling
Arrangements
The authoritative statement of the arm’s length prin-
ciple is found in Article 9(1) of the OECD Model Tax
Convention (OECD Model). This provision, when
applied to physical cash pooling transactions, implies
that – from a transfer pricing perspective – physical
cash pooling transactions among associated enterprises
must be at arm’s length.15 Thus, in order to determine
arm’s length consideration for these transactions, com-
parable transactions between independent enterprises
in similar circumstances must be identified. However,
cash pooling transactions are usually not found
between independent enterprises.16 The limited avail-
ability of third-party evidence does not necessarily
mean that cash pool transactions are not at arm’s
length at all or cannot be priced at arm’s length.17
In particular, if the commercial rationale of the opera-
tion of a cash pool can be demonstrated (e.g. reduction
of transaction costs), cash pooling transactions should
not be disregarded for transfer pricing purposes.18
Even though tax authorities generally acknowledge
that the reasons for the establishment of cash pooling
arrangements can be commercially justified,19 they
nevertheless carry out detailed tax audits to determine
the transfer pricing aspects of cash pools.20 Thus, the
application of the arm’s length principle to physical
cash pooling transactions requires careful
consideration.21
Additionally, the interpretation and application of the
arm’s length principle has significantly been enhanced by
the OECD/G20 BEPS project.22 BEPS Actions 8–10 seek
to align transfer pricing outcomes with value creation.23
In this regard, the concept of ‘actual conduct’ plays an
important role.24 Specifically, the OECD has clarified that
if the actual conduct of an entity differs from contractual
arrangements, the actual conduct will prevail.25 In a nut-
shell, this economic approach to transfer pricing seeks to
appropriately understand the role and function of the
group company and its contribution to overall value crea-
tion in the group.26 The appropriate ‘people functions’
can now be considered as the prominent factor for alloca-
tion of risks and returns to an entity, rather than the
contractual arrangements.27 These changes in the inter-
pretation and application of the arm’s length principle
may provide the tax administration in each case with the
ability – perhaps even a mandate – to look behind con-
tractual arrangements and to examine the actual conduct
of the parties.28 Given this, it is necessary to ascertain
whether the physical cash pooling arrangements are
aligned with the actual conduct of the parties. If the
contractual arrangements differ from the actual conduct
Notes
12 J. Hollas & G. Hands, Transfer Pricing and Intra Group Cash Pooling, 19(20) Tax Mgmt. Transfer Pricing Rep. 4 (Feb. 2011).
13 OECD, supra n. 3, paras 119 et seq.; ibid.; Chand, supra n. 2, at 42.
14 Petruzzi, supra n. 10, at 146 & 147; Russo & Moerer, supra n. 7, at 45; Chand, supra n. 2, at 39; Hollas & Hands, supra n. 12, at 4.
15 For a detailed analysis of the arm’s length principle, see J. Wittendorff, Transfer Pricing and the Arm’s Length Principle in International Tax Law, Series on International Taxation
(Kluwer Tax Law International 2010). For a critical discussion on the arm’s length principle, see L. Schoueri, Arm’s Length: Beyond the Guidelines of the OECD, 69(12) Bull.
Int’l Tax’n 690–716 (2015).
16 OECD, supra n. 3, para. 100; Andresen, Pearson-Wood & Jørgensen, supra n. 3, at 464; Vistisen, supra n. 3, at 189.
17 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations para. 1.11 (OECD Publishing 10 July 2017).
18 Ibid., para. 1.123.
19 UK: Her Majesty Revenue and Customs (HMRC), Cash Pooling: Introduction to Cash Pooling, INTM 503110.
20 Łukosz, Ursu & Druga, supra n. 2, at 208; Chand, supra n. 2, at 38–47.
21 OECD, supra n. 17, para. 1.11; OECD, supra n. 3, para. 100. See also CH: Federal Supreme Court, 16 Oct. 2014, BGE 104 III 533.
22 Collier & Andrus, supra n. 5, para. 6.13.
23 OECD, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation – Actions 8-10 Final Reports, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing 5 Oct.
2015).
24 OECD, supra n. 17, para. 1.51.
25 Ibid., paras 1.45 & 1.119–1.128.
26 Ibid., para. 1.6.
27 M. Heggmair, The New Interpretation of the Arm’s Length Principle: A Post-BEPS Evaluation, 24(4) Int’l Transfer Pricing J. 2 et seq. (2017). The new economic interpretation of
the arm’s length principle in Art. 9(1) OECD Model Tax Convention (2017) seems to be inspired by the former work of the OECD on the attribution of profits to permanent
establishments in Art. 7 (2) OECD Model Tax Convention (2017) (Authorized OECD Approach). See W. Schön, International Taxation of Risk, 68(6/7) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 290
(2014); J. Wittendorff, BEPS Actions 8-10: Birth of a New Arm’s Length Principle, 81(4) Tax Notes Int’l 331–32 (2016).
28 Collier & Andrus, supra n. 5, para. 6.13.
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(economic substance of the transaction), transfer price
adjustments could be imposed.29
Against this background, the OECD recently released
its long-expected discussion draft on the transfer pricing
aspects of financial transactions including cash pooling
transactions (OECD Discussion Draft on Financial
Transactions, or simply Discussion Draft) aimed at pro-
viding guidance in this very controversial area.30 The
major statements in the guidance related to cash pooling
transactions can be summarized as follows:
– characterization: The OECD defines cash pooling as the
pooling of balances as part of a short-term liquidity
management arrangement.31 It emphasizes that the
application of the arm’s length principle would need
to consider not only the facts and circumstances of the
cash transfers, but the wider context of the cash pool-
ing arrangement32;
– remuneration of the CPL: The CPL must be remunerated
based on the functions it performs.33 If the role of the
CPL goes beyond that of a service provider, it may be
entitled to earn more than a routine return for the
services it provides.34 An arm’s length remuneration
may even be composed of an arm’s length interest
spread between the borrowing and lending positions35;
– cash pool benefit: The cash pool benefit (generally com-
posed of, for example, the netting benefit and the
volume discount)36 must be established through a
functional analysis and should generally be shared
among the cash pool members, provided that an
appropriate reward is attributed to the CPL for the
function it performs.37 The OECD also illustrates
three possible (non-exclusive) approaches for the allo-
cation of the cash pool benefit38; and
– cash pool guarantees: The issuance of guarantees
between cash pool members for each other (cross-
guarantees) may be nothing more than an acknowl-
edgement that it would be detrimental to the interest of the
group not to support the performance of the CPL and so, by
extension, the borrower.39 Thus, a guarantee fee would,
in such cases, typically not be payable.
Although the Discussion Draft was aimed at clarifying
the application of the arm’s length principle to cash
pooling transactions, some critical areas of cash pooling
are not sufficiently discussed and explained in the
Discussion Draft (e.g. determination and allocation of
the cash pool benefit and the impact of the negative
interest rate environment). Also, the Discussion Draft
itself does not represent the consensus view of the
OECD on the application of the arm’s length principle
to financial transactions. It is (only) intended to provide
stakeholders with substantive proposals for analysis and
comment.40 Thus, common principles for determining the
transfer pricing of financial transactions (including cash
pooling transactions) are not yet available.
3 CASH POOL BORROWINGS AND CASH POOL
DEPOSITS
3.1 Classification of the Funds
3.1.1 Classification for Domestic Law (Civil Law)
Purposes
Physical cash pooling entails actual cash movements
between the CPL and the cash pool members. The cash
pool members could either have cash deposits or cash pool
borrowings with the master account of the CPL. These
cash deposits and cash borrowings generally replace the
balances that the cash pool members would have with
external banks in the absence of the cash pooling arrange-
ment. Thus, the cash transfers create intercompany finan-
cial arrangements that must be classified and priced at
arm’s length.
In the authors’ opinion, first, it is necessary to ascertain
if the financial arrangements arising from the cash
Notes
29 It is clear that Art. 9 (1) OECD Model Tax Convention (2017) authorizes a state to make price adjustments. However, it is arguable whether the provisions authorize structural
adjustments. In the authors’ opinion, Art. 9 authorizes structural adjustments that are commercially irrational. This being said, such adjustments must be authorized by
domestic law of a state. For a detailed discussion of this issue and the scope of Art. 9(1) vis-à-vis structural adjustments, see A. Bullen, Arm’s Length Transaction Structures:
Recognizing and Restructuring Controlled Transactions in Transfer Pricing, IBFD Doctoral Series vol. 20 (IBFD 2011); J. Wittendorff, The Transactional Ghost of Article 9(1) of the
OECD Model, 63(3) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 108 (2009); A. Navarro, Transactional Adjustments in Transfer Pricing, IBFD Doctoral Series vol. 40, 79–111 (IBFD 2018); A. Navarro, The
Arm’s Length Standard and Tax Justice: Reflections on the Present and Future of Transfer Pricing, 10(3) World Tax J. 374–77 (2018).
30 OECD, supra n. 3, paras 94–131.
31 Ibid., para. 95.
32 Ibid., para. 101.
33 Ibid., para. 109.
34 Ibid., para. 112.
35 Ibid., para. 122.
36 Ibid., para. 125.
37 Ibid., paras 104, 105.
38 Ibid., paras 124–29.
39 Ibid., paras 130–31.
40 Ibid., preface.
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movements qualify as loans or something else under
domestic law.41 For example from a German perspective,
a loan arrangement (under Section 488 of the German
Civil Code) is generally defined as the temporary lending
of capital from the lender to a borrower. The borrower has
the right to use the capital, but generally bears a repay-
ment and compensation obligation (Section 488(1), sen-
tence 1 of the German Civil Code). The purpose of
physical cash pooling is to facilitate efficient cash alloca-
tion within the group. From the perspective of the single
cash pool member, the cash movements within a physical
cash pool may therefore comprise the temporary lending
of capital from the CPL to the cash pool members and vice
versa. Thus, they may be characterized as loan
arrangements.42 Also, the German Federal Court43 classi-
fied the financial arrangements as loan arrangements for
domestic law purposes. Thus, a cash pool borrowing gen-
erally creates a loan liability of the cash pool member and,
correspondingly, a loan receivable of the CPL. A cash pool
deposit leads, on the other hand, to a loan liability of the
CPL and a loan receivable of the cash pool member for the
same amount.44
3.1.2 Classification for Transfer Pricing Purposes
Even if the cash transfers between the members of a
physical cash pool qualify as (short-term) loans,45 under
Article 9(1) of the OECD Model (2017) it is necessary to
ask whether these loans are at arm’s length.46 Group
companies (as a result of their group relationship) might
not act as third parties would in comparable circum-
stances. The actual conduct of the parties (and the options
realistically available to them) may therefore be determi-
native rather than the contractual arrangements.47 Thus,
the classification of the financial arrangements for transfer
pricing purposes must consider the factual circumstances
of the cash transfers. A classification based on the con-
tractual arrangements alone will likely not be sufficient
for transfer pricing purposes.48
For instance in the Discussion Draft, the OECD
assumes a situation where a group company is obliged
by the group’s policy to participate in the physical cash
pool and to transfer or borrow funds from the cash pool,
also if it had not participated given the particular condi-
tions it faces.49 The actual low – or even negative – interest
rate environment could potentially have such an impact
on physical cash pooling transactions.50
Nevertheless, given that it can be demonstrated that
the operation of a physical cash pool (as a whole) has a
commercial rationale from the group’s perspective (such as
interest rate savings), the individual loan arrangements
should not be disregarded for transfer pricing purposes.51
The particular conditions of the cash pool member (e.g.
cash pool interest rates) could rather be tested against the
next-best options that are realistically available to it (e.g.
interest rates as offered or applied by external banks).52
This could result in transfer pricing adjustments, however
not in non-recognition of the cash pool loans.53
On the other hand, one might asked if, in such a
situation, the actual participation of the cash pool member
in the cash pool creates a benefit for the cash pool or the
group as a whole. Given this, and assuming that there is a
clearly identifiable benefit, one could even argue that the
cash pool member renders a service to the cash pool or the
group as a whole by its participation in the cash pool.
Thus, a service fee could potentially be payable.54
However, the particular conditions of the cash pool mem-
ber should always be analysed and be based on a two-sided
Notes
41 The classification of arrangements under domestic laws is also necessary to determine the legal rights and obligations of the parties as required in the performance of a
functional analysis. OECD, supra n. 17, para. 1.51.
42 K. P. Berger, §488, in Münchner Kommentar Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch para. 32 (Beck 2016).
43 DE: BGH, 16 Jan. 2006, II RZ 75/04, GmbHR 2006, at 477.
44 Berger, supra n. 42, § 488, para. 32.
45 Petruzzi, supra n. 10, at 223; Russo & Moerer, supra n. 7, at 43. PwC, supra n. 1, at 141; Bakker, supra n. 9, at 30; Hollas & Hands, supra n. 12, at 3.
46 V. Chand, Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intra-Group Loans in Light of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action Plan, 44(12) Intertax 885 et seq. (2016).
47 Collier & Andrus, supra n. 5, para. 6.13.
48 OECD, supra n. 17, paras 1.42 et seq.
49 Ibid., para. 102.
50 See s. 6. infra (on the negative interest rate environment).
51 The OECD stipulates that transaction may be disregarded, where the arrangements made in relation to the transactions, viewed in their totality, differ from those which
would have been adopted by independent enterprises. OECD, supra n. 17, para. 1.122.
52 The OECD seem to regard interest rates that the cash pool members would have received from, or owed to, the bank absent the pooling arrangement as an option
realistically available to the cash pool members. OECD, supra n. 3, para. 125. For a detailed discussion of this concept, see S. Parekh, The Concept of ‘Options Realistically
Available’ Under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 22(5) Int’l Transfer Pricing J. (Sept. 2015); Bullen, supra n. 29, at 540–63.
53 A tax administration should disregard the actual transaction only in exceptional cases. OECD, supra n. 17, para. 1.121; OECD, Comments Received on Public Discussion
Draft – BEPS Actions 8-10: Financial Transactions: Part III (OECD 14 Sept. 2018), Comments by WTS Global, at 361, 384.
54 The OECD believes that a service fee could potentially be payable to a loss bearing group company in a situation where a group company consistently realizes losses because
it produces, obliged by the group’s policy, loss-making products while other members produce profit-making products. OECD, supra n. 17, para. 1.130. One could argue
that the same logic could apply to cash pooling arrangements where a group company is obliged to participate in the cash pool also if it had not participated given the bad
conditions it faces.
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approach, meaning that the position of the counterparty
to the transaction should be considered. It would arguably
not be at arm’s length if one decides to grant benefits to a
particular cash pool member without an economically
viable justification from the perspective of the
counterparty.55 Thus, the decision to enhance the condi-
tions for one cash pool member should be based on a
consistent mechanism that also takes the position of the
counterparty into account.56
Furthermore, considering that the risk of double
taxation is actually significant in such a situation, tax
authorities should formulate appropriate conclusions
only after a thorough analysis of all relevant facts. A
multi-year analysis may, for instance, demonstrate that
the cash pool created sufficient benefits for the parti-
cular cash pool member in the past and that the actual
‘bad’ conditions are only the result of short-term mar-
ket fluctuations.57 On the other hand, an independent
enterprise could be willing to accept ‘bad’ conditions in
the cash pool as a part of its business strategy or due to
particular economic circumstances. For example it could
be that the enterprise requires access to cash that is
readily available in a particular situation (e.g. to cover
unexpected short-term debts) or in a business environ-
ment (e.g. highly volatile financial markets) where it is
difficult to plan and to fulfil the short-term liquidity
needs.58 Thus, the application of transfer pricing
adjustments or the assumption of an additional service
provision may not be an adequate measure in this
situation.
Additionally, also if cash pooling is performed on
the assumption that cash deposits and borrowings are
of a short-term nature,59 there could be situations
where cash pool balances become ‘long term’ (more
than six or twelve months)60 as, amongst group com-
panies, there may not be performed the same level of
monitoring (as an independent enterprises would per-
form) or there may be no criteria being applied to
determine when a balance becomes long term or
structural.61 However, the application of short-term
interest rates on such positions might not correspond
to the behaviour of independent enterprises in compar-
able circumstances. More specifically, independent
parties would usually agree to a higher interest rate.62
Thus, structural positions within a physical cash pool
could potentially be characterized as long-term
loans.63
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the single group
company, several reasons may exist to maintain the struc-
tural balance in the cash pool. For instance an indepen-
dent enterprise may decide to keep structural positions in
a cash pool for general market reasons (e.g. global or local
financial crisis) or specific business reasons (e.g. expected
defaults of customers or planned investment activities), or
there may actually not be another more attractive option
that is realistically available to the enterprise.64 If the
group company can explain the underlying economic
reasons for the liquidity buffer and can further provide
appropriate documentation, the tax administrations
should not reclassify the (short-term) cash pool loans.
Thus, the broader circumstances of the structural balance
should also be examined (and documented) to arrive at an
appropriate conclusion.
3.2 Arm’s Length Pricing
3.2.1 Banking Approach: Application of Bank
Interest Rates
Given the general classification of the financial arrange-
ments as short-term loans, a question arises with respect
to how arm’s length interest rates can be calculated.
Usually the (internal or external) comparable uncontrolled
price method (CUP method) is applied to determine
(arm’s length) interest rates for (short-term) cash pool
loans. Within this framework, there are two main pricing
approaches, namely (i) the banking approach (application
of bank interest rates)65 and (ii) the build-up approach
Notes
55 Also, the conditions of the counterparty must be tested against the next best options.
56 OECD, supra n. 3, paras 47 et seq.
57 OECD, supra n. 53, Comments by WU Transfer Pricing Center, at 407.
58 Access to liquidity involves costs. Łukosz, Ursu & Druga, supra n. 2, at 208. Therefore, having access to cash i.e. readily available could be regarded as ‘asset’ that should be
considered in the evaluation process.
59 OECD, supra n. 3, paras 106 & 107.
60 In the view of the UK tax authorities, a period exceeding twelve months could be regarded as an indication of a ‘structural position’. HMRC, supra n. 19. The Belgian
authorities, on the other hand, consider a period of six months as indicative for a structural position. KPMG, Belgium: Draft Circular Letter on Transfer Pricing, Insights (Nov.
2018).
61 PwC, supra n. 1, at 140.
62 The credit risk of the borrower is the deciding pricing factor to be considered in debt-financing decisions. The credit risks generally increase with the increase in the
maturity of the loan.
63 OECD, supra n. 3, para. 107.
64 For an extensive discussion on this matter, see Łukosz, Ursu & Druga, supra n. 2, at 209–15; The British tax authorities illustrates certain factors to be considered when
analysing structural positions within a cash pool. HMRC, supra n. 19.
65 This approach is often illustrated and discussed in the German transfer pricing literature. See e.g. X. Ditz & V. Tcherveniachki, Fremdübliche Verzinsung im Rahmen eines
grenzüberschreitenden Cash Pools, 11 Internationales Steuerrecht (IStR) 399 (2014).
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(adding a risk premium to a (short-term) risk-free base
rate).66
In absence of the cash pooling arrangement, the single cash
pool members could maintain cash deposits and cash borrow-
ings with an external bank. By establishing the cash pool,
these arrangements with external banks are replaced by
arrangements with the CPL. Thus, for transfer pricing pur-
poses, it could be an option to apply the same interest rates as
applied by the external banks on current accounts of the single
group companies.
By applying bank interest rates on the single loan
arrangements between the CPL and the cash pool members,
the CPL would generally earn the same interest income as
an external bank, namely an interest spread between lower
interest rates on cash deposits and higher interest rates on
cash borrowings. However, these interest rates might not
necessarily be considered at arm’s length.67 Under the
arm’s length principle, the CPL must be remunerated on
the basis of the functions actually performed (including
assets used and risks assumed).68 The CPL could be nothing
more than a (low-risk) financial service provider.69 Such a
CPL would arguably not be entitled to earn this interest
spread.70 This being said, even if the CPL assumes more
functions such that it qualifies as an internal bank, the
functional analysis may nevertheless show that the CPL is
not necessarily comparable with a bank. For example banks
generally operate a more complex business model, have
different cost structures, implement highly sophisticated
risk diversification strategies and are governed by special
regulations.71
Moreover, from the perspective of the single cash pool
depositor, a cash pool deposit with the CPLmay not be subject
to the same level of credit risk as a cash deposit with an
external bank. The credit risk of a bank (i.e. the risk that the
external bank is in default with their payments) is typically
lower than the credit risk of the CPL or of the cash pool
borrowers. An independent enterprise would therefore not
necessarily agree to the application to lower deposit rates as
applied by an external bank.72
The Danish Administrative Tax Court in the Bombardier
case as well as the Norwegian Court of Appeal in the
ConocoPhillips case did not accept the application of bank
interest rates on physical cash pooling arrangements in light
of the particular facts and circumstances of the cases.73
Especially in a situation where the CPL assumes only limited
functions, has a poor amount of capital at risk and bears
limited risks, the application of bank interest rates might be
challenged by the tax authorities. Bank interest rates should
therefore generally not be applied.74 However, they can
nevertheless be useful to evaluate the options realistically
available to the cash pool members.75
3.2.2 Build-Up Approach: Adding a Risk Premium to
a (Short-Term) Risk-Free Base Rate
Arm’s length interest rates could potentially also be deter-
mined by the application of a build-up approach, i.e. by
adding a risk premium to a (short-term) risk-free base rate.76
The first factor, i.e. (short-term) risk-free base rate, can easily
be determined on the basis of public information (e.g. LIBID,
LIBOR).77 The second factor, i.e. risk premium for the specific
credit risk of borrower, can instead be derived from data on
default yield spreads related to the credit risk of the
borrower.78
An advantage of this approach is that it generally
considers the particular circumstances of the loan arrange-
ments, such as characteristics of the borrower (e.g. sector
or market in which the borrower is engaged) and the
maturity of the specific loan.79 Thus, the specific facts
and circumstances of the loans arising from the cash
movements in a physical cash pool can be considered by
applying this approach. However, one of the most debated
Notes
66 Petruzzi, supra n. 10, at 223; PwC, supra n. 1, at 141.
67 Bakker, supra n. 9, at 32.
68 OECD, supra. n. 3, para. 109.
69 Ibid., para. 111.
70 Bakker, supra n. 9, at 32.
71 These are typical reasonings by the German tax authorities when rejecting the application of bank interest rates. Schreiber & D. Bubeck, Fremdvergleich beim internationalen
Cash Pool – Preisvergleich oder cost plus, 18 Der Betrieb 983 (2014). Also, the OECD does not seem to agree with the application of bank interest rates, stating that ‘a cash pool
is likely to differ from a straightforward overnight deposit with a bank’. OECD, supra n. 3, para. 101.
72 PwC, supra n. 1, at 140; Bakker, supra n. 9, at 30; Hollas & Hands, supra n. 12, at 4.
73 DK: LSR, 21 Oct. 2013, Case 12-0189459; NO: LR (Court of Appeal), 11 Jan. 2010, ConocoPhillips Skandinavia AS & Norske ConocoPhillips AS v. Oljeskattekontoret
[ConocoPhillips Scandinavia AS & Norwegian ConocoPhillips AS v. Oil Tax Office], LB-2009-081881, Utv 2010. See Vistisen, supra n. 3, at 191; Andresen, Pearson-Wood
& Jørgensen, supra n. 3, at 462–63.
74 Bakker, supra n. 9, at 32; OECD, supra n. 53, Comments by WTS Global, at 385; A. Rafiq et al., Cash Pooling in Today’s World: A Transfer Pricing Perspective, 18(18) Tax
Mgmt. Transfer Pricing Rep. s. 3.2 (2010).
75 OECD, supra n. 3, para. 125.
76 Petruzzi, supra n. 10, at 223; PwC, supra n. 1, at 141.
77 Russo & Moerer, supra n. 7, at 45; Chand, supra n. 2, at 41.
78 Chand, supra n. 46, at 889–90; M. Pankiv, Contemporary Application of the Arm’s Length Principle in Transfer Pricing, WU series vol. 6, Ch. 4, 79 (IBFD 2017).
79 Petruzzi, supra n. 10, at 212.
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issues with regard to this approach is the credit assessment
and, especially, the type of the credit rating that can be
used to derive proper risk premiums. Three approaches
could be considered.
– application of the credit rating of the group: The underlying
assumption of this approach is that the individual cred-
itworthiness of a group company is always equal to the
creditworthiness of the group as a whole. Differently
stated, a group would always prevent a default of a single
group company as long as the group as a whole is not in
default.80 For example in the Bombardier case, the Danish
Tax Court upheld the position of the tax authorities to
apply the group rating for the interest calculation on a
cash pool deposit.81 Also, a lower German tax court
recently reasoned in the context of intra-group loans
that the credit rating of the single group company can
only be that of the group82;
– determination and application of a stand-alone credit rating
without consideration of implicit support: This approach
assumes that each group company has its individual credit
rating and that group affiliation does not affect this rating.
For instance one of the takeaways from the Australian
Federal Court decision in the Chevron Australia case83
was that group affiliation should be considered, but it
has very little impact on the pricing of third parties84; and
– determination and application of a stand-alone credit rating
adjusted for implicit support: This approach is based on the
assumption that each group company has its individual
credit rating. However, the group affiliation can posi-
tively or negatively affect the individual credit worthi-
ness of the group company. Thus, the individual credit
rating should be adjusted for implicit support arising
from the group affiliation. For example this approach
was applied by the Tax Court of Canada in the GE
Capital case.85 Furthermore, the example on the effect
of group affiliation on guarantees illustrated in the
revised OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines86 (OECD
Guidelines) indicates that the OECD also supports this
view.
With regard to physical cash pooling, it is imaginable
that also independent parties establishing a pooling sys-
tem would consider the creditworthiness as a significant
pricing criterion.87 Independent parties, as the methods
and tools used by international credit rating firms show,
start from the analysis of the creditworthiness of the single
(group) company. However, group affiliation is considered
in the rating.88 Thus, also independent parties would
generally base their lending decision on the creditworthi-
ness of the borrower (adjusted for implicit support).
Consequently, from an arm’s length perspective, the start-
ing point should be the stand-alone credit rating of the
single group company (adjusted for implicit support).
Credit rating analysis should therefore be performed for
all cash pool members, including the CPL.89
However, the loans arising from the cash movements
between the CPL and the cash pool members are
embedded in a wider context of the physical cash pooling
arrangements. As explained above, cash pooling could
create benefits (such as a volume discount) that are not
available to the cash pooling participants on a stand-alone
basis.90 For example the arm’s length interest rate for a
single cash pool deposit may be 4%, while the external
bank applies an interest rate of 6% on the cash deposit in
the master account due to economies of scale.91 A transac-
tional pricing of the cash pool loans (on the basis of the
stand-alone credit profiles of the cash pool members,
including the CPL) may not necessarily ensure an arm’s
length allocation of the additional benefits (such as the
volume discount – if any) arising from economies of
scale.92 As a result, the stand-alone pricing of the
Notes
80 PwC, supra n. 1, at 135.
81 Vistisen, supra n. 3, at 190 et seq.
82 DE: FG Münster, 7 Dec. 2016, 13 K 4037/13, K,F, para. 91.
83 AU: FCA, 23 Oct. 2015, Chevron Australia Holdings Pty Ltd v. Commissioner of Taxation (No 4), [2015] FCA 1092.
84 M. Butler, J. Pengelly & R. Neilson, Federal Court Hands Down Transfer Pricing Decision in Chevron Australia Case, 23(1) Int’l Transfer Pricing J. 31 (2016); J. Hollas & G.
Hands, Intercompany Financial Transactions: Factor to Consider in Analysing the Impact of Implicit Parental Support, 22(20) Tax Mgmt. Transfer Pricing Rep. 3 (2011).
85 CA: TC, 4 Dec. 2009, General Electric Capital Canada, Inc. v. The Queen, 2009 TCC 563, aff’d 2010 FCA 344 (1 Nov. 2010).
86 OECD, supra n. 17, para. 1.164.
87 Russo & Moerer, supra n. 7, at 45; Petruzzi, supra n. 10, at 145; PwC, supra n. 1, at 140 & 141; Chand, supra n. 2, at 41. Also, the OECD Discussion Draft on Financial
Transactions emphasizes that the credit risk could be a significant criterion for the allocation of the cash pool benefit. OECD, supra n. 3, paras 127–29. There can also be
other significant risks linked to the cash pool. In the context of the actual low or even negative interest rate environment, other risks (such as liquidity risks) could be
significant, as well.
88 S&P distinguishes between core, highly strategic, strategically important, moderately strategic and non-strategic entities of the group. S&P, Group Rating Methodology and
Assumptions (9 Nov. 2011), http://img.en25.com/Web/StandardandPoors/GroupRatingMethodology%20110911.pdf (accessed 6 Sept. 2018).
89 PwC, supra n. 1, at 141; Petruzzi, supra n. 10, at 145; by contrast, the Belgian tax authorities assume that all companies in a cash pool have the same credit rating. KPMG,
supra n. 60. The credit rating can generally be determined on the basis of different methods, e.g. financial ratios analysis, credit scoring tools, notch up/down parent rating,
etc.
90 OECD, supra n. 3, para. 94.
91 Russo & Moerer, supra n. 7, at 46.
92 PwC, supra n. 1, at 142. Nevertheless, the allocation of the cash pool benefits should be combined with the arm’s length standalone interest rate. OECD, Comments Received on
Public Discussion Draft – BEPS Actions 8-10: Financial Transactions: Part I (OECD 14 Sept. 2018), Comments by BE-VVA, at 91, 92.
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individual cash pooling loans on the basis of a build-up
approach can be considered only as a first step to ensure an
arm’s length allocation of the cash pool benefit within a
physical cash pool.
4 CASH POOL GUARANTEES93
4.1 General Principles Articulated by
International Tax Courts94 and the OECD
(so far)
A (financial) guarantee can generally be defined as a
‘legally binding commitment on the part of the guaran-
tor to assume a specified obligation of the guaranteed
debtor (beneficiary) if the debtor defaults on that
obligation’.95 In a physical cash pool, the PCo of the
group or other group companies (as guarantors) may be
required by the external bank (as creditor) to issue a
guarantee on behalf of the CPL (as beneficiary of the
guarantee).96 The issuance of the guarantee may entail
certain benefits for the CPL (and the other cash pool
members) such as enhanced credit terms.97 The provision
of a guarantee could therefore (potentially) be classified
as an intra-group service by the intercompany guarantor
to the cash pool. Thus, under the arm’s length principle,
the question needs to be asked as to whether a service has
actually been rendered and what the arm’s length remu-
neration of that service provision is.98
In 2000, the German Federal Tax Court issued a verdict
on a guarantee-related issue.99 A PCo of a group residing in
Germany issued a guarantee on behalf of a subsidiary, a
finance company of the group, in the Netherlands. The
subsidiary needed the (explicit) guarantee of its PCo in
order to borrow a certain amount of debt from external
parties. It was a fact that, without the guarantee, the sub-
sidiary would not have received any financing from external
parties, as the subsidiary did not have sufficient equity to
assume its functions as a financing company of the group.
The Federal Tax Court reasoned that, in this case, the
guarantee by the PCo on behalf of its subsidiary cannot be
regarded as a service, as the subsidiary would otherwise not
maintain sufficient capital to perform its functions. Stated
differently, the necessity to provide the guarantee was borne
by the shareholder relationship. The guarantee can therefore
be characterized as a substitute of equity.100
On the other hand, in the Canadian GE Capital case,101
a US PCo issued an (explicit) guarantee on behalf of its
subsidiary residing in Canada that required external finan-
cing. As a result, the Canadian subsidiary paid a guarantee
fee to its PCo. The Canadian tax authorities did not
consider the payment to be deductible. The Canadian
Tax Court, however, reasoned that, considering the cir-
cumstances of the case, a guarantee fee is payable because
the Canadian subsidiary benefits from a reduction of
funding costs as an effect of the issuance of the explicit
guarantee to the external creditor. Thus, in the opinion of
the Tax Court, the guarantee fee had to be adjusted by the
impact of implicit support, as the effect of group affilia-
tion does not justify a separate payment.102
The OECD Discussion Draft on Financial Transactions
also indicates that a guarantee could have two effects:
– it allows the borrower to borrow a greater amount of
debt. In such a situation, the (additional) amount of
debt borrowed by a borrower could be regarded as a
loan from the lender to the guarantor and as an equity
contribution from the guarantor to the borrower. As a
result, a guarantee fee may not be payable from the
beneficiary to the guarantor103; or
– it could be a mere reduction of funding costs for the
borrower. In such a case, a guarantee fee from the
borrower to guarantor could be payable if the interest
rate of the borrower is enhanced over and above the
level of implicit support.104
Notes
93 The authors focus on the provision of explicit guarantees within the multinational group, as such instruments create legally enforceable obligations for the guarantor.
94 The court decisions do not specifically concern physical cash pooling structures. Nevertheless, in the views of the authors, the general principles as illustrated by the Courts
may also be relevant for guarantees issued in favour of the CPL.
95 OECD, supra n. 3, para. 138.
96 Russo & Moerer, supra n. 7, at 45; Chand, supra n. 2, at 40.
97 PwC, supra n. 1, at 141.
98 OECD, supra n. 17, para. 7.5.
99 DE: BFH, 29 Nov. 2000, I R 85/95, Federal Tax Gazette (BStBl.) issue II, 2002, at 720; also the European Court of Justice has recently decided on a intercompany
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authorities. Schreiber & Bubeck, supra n. 71, at 985.
101 CA: TC, 4 Dec. 2009, General Electric Capital Canada, Inc. v. The Queen, 2009 TCC 563, aff’d 2010 FCA 344 (1 Nov. 2010).
102 V. Averyanova & J. Sampat, Transfer Pricing of Intra-Group Financial Guarantees in Light of the BEPS Action Plan, 22(6) Int’l Transfer Pricing J. 363, 364 (2015). For a critical
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Taking into consideration the decisions of both various
national courts and the OECD, it could generally be
important to look at the position of the beneficiary of
the guarantee. The provision of a guarantee fee could be
characterized as a service provision if the beneficiary (only)
benefits from a reduction of funding costs (over and above
the level of implicit support). However, the answer could
be different if the beneficiary would, in absence of the
guarantee, not receive the same amount of debt from
external parties. In such a case, the issuance of the guar-
antee could be characterized as a substitute for equity (i.e.
a shareholder activity).
4.2 Application to Cash Pool Guarantees
In the authors’ opinion, these principles can generally also
be applied to analyse guarantees issued in favour of the
CPL in a physical cash pool. Thus, if the issuance of the
guarantee only reduces the external funding costs of the
CPL (over and above the level of implicit support), a
guarantee fee could be payable. On the other hand, if – in
absence of the explicit guarantee from the parent entity
(shareholder) – the CPL cannot borrow the same amount
of debt, the payment of a guarantee fee might not be
justified.
However, in a physical cash pool, it could also be the
case that all cash pool members are required to issue an
explicit guarantee on behalf of the CPL, such that all
cash pool members are jointly and severally liable (a so-
called ‘cross-guarantee’).105 The OECD Discussion
Draft addresses the implications of cross-guarantees on
cash pooling transactions.106 The occurrence of cross-
guarantees implies that each guarantor provides a guar-
antee for all cash pool members, but does not have
control over the cash pool nor has access to information
about the borrowers. An independent party would nor-
mally not enter into such an arrangement. The OECD
concludes that the guarantee could be nothing more
than an acknowledgement that it would be detrimental
to the interests of the group not to support the cash
pool.107 Thus, in general, a (separate) guarantee fee
might not be payable. Also, the benefit created by the
issuance of a cross-guarantee by the cash pool members
on behalf of the CPL can often be negligible,108 espe-
cially if the CPL has sufficient equity at risk.
Nevertheless, in some limited circumstances, it may
be reasonable to further analyse the effect of the issu-
ance of the cross-guarantee on the position of the cash
pool members as cross-guarantors.109
If it can be substantiated on the basis of the facts and
circumstances of each case, that the issuance of a guarantee
by a guarantor creates a service from the guarantor to the
CPL, it is necessary to determine what the arm’s length
service fee (i.e. guarantee fee) is. According to the OECD,
there are generally different methods available (e.g. the
CUP method, the yield approach, the cost approach) that
could determine arm’s length guarantee fees.110 The yield
approach is the most commonly used method in practice
and, apparently, the preferred one of the OECD.111 In
general terms, the yield approach determines the arm’s
length guarantee fee as the difference between the interest
rate that the borrower could obtain on a stand-alone basis
(adjusted for implicit support), and the interest rate that
the borrower could obtain with inclusion of the guarantee.
The yield approach, thus, provides a range of possible
guarantee fees. The actual guarantee fee must be fixed
within this range.112 The following simplified example
illustrates the determination of an arm’s length guarantee
fee on the basis of the yield approach:
Assumed that the stand-alone interest rate which the
borrower would obtain (without inclusion of implicit
support) is 8% (credit rating: Bba). With inclusion of
implicit support, the borrowing rate can be reduced to
5% (enhanced credit rating of the company because of
group affiliation i.e. A). With the issuance of the guaran-
tee by the guarantor, the interest rate as offered by the
creditor is again reduced to 4% (improved credit rating
due to the explicit guarantee, i.e. triple-A credit rating).
Thus, the arm’s length guarantee fee should be within the
range of 0 to 1%, as the effect of the implicit support
(here, 3%) does not justify a separate payment (no legally
binding commitment of the group).113 The benefit (here,
Notes
105 For more details about transfer pricing implications of the issuance of cross-guarantees in notional cash pools, see F. Sousa & B. Santiago, Portuguese Arbitration Tax Court Rules
on Notional Cash Pooling Arrangements, 70(10) Tax Notes Int’l 999–1003 (2013).
106 OECD, supra n. 3, paras 130, 131. In practise, such guarantees are frequently issued in the context of notional arrangements (as opposed to physical arrangements).
107 Ibid., para. 131.
108 OECD, supra n. 53, Comments by PwC, at 134.
109 For example assuming a situation where the CPL only qualifies as (low risk) financial service provider (with a low amount of equity at risk) and if, in such a case, the credit
rate enhancement from the guarantee goes beyond the level attributable to implicit support, it could be necessary to further analyse the effect on the position of the cash pool
members. OECD, Comments Received on Public Discussion Draft – BEPS Actions 8-10: Financial Transactions: Part II (OECD 14 Sept. 2018), Comments by KPMG, at 224.
However, in such a situation, it may be difficult to determine the degree of real risk assumed by the cash pool members (as cross guarantors) due to the usually large number
of participants and the permanent fluctuations in balances. OECD, supra n. 109, Comments by EY, at 85.
110 OECD, supra n. 3, paras 145–55.
111 Petruzzi, supra n. 10, at 138. The Belgian tax authorities prefer the application of this approach. See KPMG, supra n. 60.
112 OECD, supra n. 3, para. 149–52.
113 OECD, supra n. 17, para. 1.167.
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1%) must be shared between the parties on the basis of
their contribution to the creation of the value.114
5 REMUNERATION OF THE CPL
5.1 Identification and Attribution
of Significant Risks to the CPL
The OECD Guidelines115 are based on the general
assumption that the remuneration of an independent
party (usually) correlates with the (economically signif-
icant) functions it performs (including the assets it uses
and risks it assumes).116 The functions performed
(including assets used and risks assumed) by a group
company and the options realistically available to the
parties117 can be established by an appropriate func-
tional analysis.118 This general approach can also be
applied to the CPL in a physical cash pool.119 Given
this – and considering that (especially) risks and their
actual assumption may play a key role in the determi-
nation of an appropriate remuneration for the CPL, one
can ask what the significant risks related to a physical
cash pooling arrangement could be and under what
conditions they can be attributed to the CPL under
the new risk and return framework as contained in
the OECD Guidelines.120
With respect to the question as to what the signifi-
cant risks linked to a physical cash pool arrangement
could be, one should consider that the most important
(bilateral) transactions within a physical cash pool are
the intercompany loans arising from the cash move-
ments between the CPL and the cash pool members.
These intercompany loans are subject to risks.
Specifically, the credit risk of the borrower121 may
play a significant role in the determination of arm’s
length interest rates for the loans within a physical
cash pool.122 Thus, credit risks can generally be
regarded as significant risks linked to a physical cash
pooling arrangement.123 The capacity to take over the
credit risks (of the cash pool borrowers) by the CPL may
therefore also be an important criterion for the estab-
lishment of an arm’s length remuneration for the
CPL.124
However, the contractual allocation of credit risks
within a physical cash pool may not be the deciding factor
for the actual attribution of the credit risk to the CPL.125
Under the new risk and return framework as contained in
the OECD Guidelines, the CPL must rather have the
capacity to actually assume those risks. More specifically,
it must have the financial capacity (equity at risk) to
assume those risks and, additionally, it should perform
control over the risk assumed.126
The ‘control over risk’ factor is generally linked to the
activities performed by the people employed by the
CPL.127 For instance the CPL could monitor the liquidity
of the cash pool members; could conduct credit ratings on
the basis of certain covenants or by the use of credit rating
tools; and could decide on securities or the replacement of
cash pool borrowings by loans. These activities could
Notes
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116 Ibid., para. 1.51.
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cash pool. In the context of the actual low or even negative interest rate environment, other risks (such as liquidity risks) might have a higher importance. EY, supra n. 109,
at 84.
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arguably be linked to the (internal) credit risks within a
physical cash pool. Thus, a CPL that conducts these
activities may be considered to perform control over the
internal credit risks.128
Given that the CPL has sufficient financial capacity
(equity at risk) and additionally performs (functional)
control over the credit risks, the credit risks should,
correspondingly, be attributed to it.129 The higher
risk assumption by the CPL should also be reflected
in its remuneration, as independent parties would
usually expect a higher compensation for a higher
risk assumption.130 Thus, with regard to physical
cash pooling arrangements, a higher risk assumption
could be reflected by higher interest rates on cash pool
borrowings and lower interest rates on cash pool
deposits.131 In the authors’ opinion, the same metho-
dology can generally also be applied to analyse and
attribute other significant risks, such as liquidity
risks.132
5.2 Application to the CPL
A CPL with a ‘low’ level of functionality and limited
financial capacity, including a low amount of equity at
risk, would arguably not be capable of assuming sig-
nificant (credit) risks. Indeed, in such a situation, the
credit risks and, in particular, the downside conse-
quences of the materialization of those risks (i.e.
default of a cash pool borrowing) might not be limited
or reduced by the CPL. By contrast, the cash pool
depositors would be primarily affected by such a
default. Thus, the cash pool depositors could therefore
be entitled to earn a (higher) interest income from the
loans as determined on the basis of the credit risks of
the cash pool borrowers.133 On the other hand, in such
circumstances, a CPL would arguably not be entitled
to more than a routine return.134 Two separate ele-
ments could be taken into consideration,135 namely (i)
remuneration for services rendered to the cash pool
members (often based on a cost-plus approach)136 and
(ii) remuneration for the CPLs equity at risk (insofar as
equity is, in fact, at risk). The remuneration of the
CPL can be established by an adjustment of the inter-
est rates for cash pool borrowings and cash pool depos-
its. Thus, the CPL could increase the deposit rates or
equalize the deposit rates and the borrowing rates,
such that it ends up with a profit level that is in
line with that of a (low-risk) financial service provider
by the end of the business year.
In contrast, a CPL with a ‘high’ level of function-
ality may also assume more strategic (valuable) func-
tions comparable to those of an external bank.137 If
the CPL has sufficient equity at risk to assume credit
risks and, additionally, performs the control over those
risks, the (credit) risks can economically be attributed
to it under the new risk-and-return framework.138
Indeed, in such a case, the (credit) risks and, in parti-
cular, the downside consequences of a materialization
of those risks (i.e. actual default of a cash pool borrow-
ing) would be taken over by the CPL. Differently
stated, the cash pool depositors would not actually
bear a high level of credit risk with regard to their
cash deposits (even if the actual risk of a default of a
cash pool borrowing is high), as the equity at risk of
the CPL actually safeguards the status of the cash
deposits.139 Given this, a CPL that qualifies as an
internal bank could be entitled to earn more than a
routine return. Thus, an arm’s length pricing of the
individual intercompany loans arising from the cash
movements (in the context of the expected higher
creditworthiness of the CPL) could already establish
an arm’s length remuneration for the CPL consisting
Notes
128 An issue could be that the concept of control does not prevent MNEs to shift profit to low-tax jurisdictions. Collier & Andrus, supra n. 5, at 228–32.
129 OECD, supra n. 17, para. 1.87 (‘Where a party contractually assuming a risk applies that contractual assumption of risk in its conduct, and also both exercises control over
the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk, then there is no further analysis required ( … ) to determine the risk assumption’.).
130 OECD, supra n. 17, para. 1.56; OECD, supra n. 92, Comments by BE-VVA, at 93.
131 Russo & Moerer, supra n. 7, at 45.
132 EY, supra n. 109, at 84 (‘The analysis should consider all risks assumed by the cash pool leader, including foreign exchange risk and liquidity risk, and not focus solely on
credit risk which is currently the implied guidance in the discussion draft’.).
133 OECD, supra n. 3, para. 129 (‘In those situations where there is a genuine credit risk to the depositors, the interest rate benefit of pooling may be rateably allocated among
the net depositors on the basis that the depositors have their capital at risk across all net borrowers from the pool members and so should be entitled to any benefits arising
from the use of that capital’.).
134 OECD, supra n. 23, at 10 (‘cash boxes’).
135 Russo & Moerer, supra n. 7, at 45–46.
136 A cost-plus 5% remuneration could be justified in those cases where the CPL can be characterized as (low-value) adding financial service provider. On the matter of low-
value added services, see Wittendorff, supra n. 27, at 355.
137 Hollas & Hands, supra n. 12, at 4.
138 OECD, supra n. 17, para. 1.87.
139 PwC, supra n. 1, at 141. Moreover, the performance of risk controlling activities by the CPL (such as monitoring the creditworthiness of the borrowers, the decision on
securities etc) may limit or reduce the risk of a default of a cash pool borrowing.
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of lower interest rates on cash deposits and higher
interest rates on cash pool borrowings.140
6 CASH POOL BENEFIT
6.1 Netting Benefit
Physical cash pooling arrangements could potentially
create benefits in the form of cost savings and other
efficiencies that would not be available to the group in
the absence of a cash pooling arrangement.141 This
benefit is referred to as cash pool benefit or synergy
benefit and is likely the result of a deliberate, con-
certed action among the cash pool members and the
CPL.142
In the view of the OECD, the cash pool benefit can
have different components.143 According to existing
literature on this topic,144 the major components are
(1) the savings from offsetting debit and credit posi-
tions (netting benefit) and (2) a ‘volume discount’ on
the overall balance.145 With regard to the character-
ization, quantification and allocation of the benefit, it
could therefore generally be reasonable to distinguish
between these two components, as both components
could be based on different determinants.146
The following simplified example illustrates the deter-
mination of the netting benefit.
A PCo has three subsidiaries, namely SCo 1, SCo 2
and SCo 3. Each subsidiary has an external bank
account. SCo1 and SCo 2 show a positive balance of
EUR 200 and EUR 150, respectively, whereas SCo3
has a negative balance of 100. The interest rates
offered by external banks are 10% on deposits (SCo1
and SCo2) and 15% on borrowings (SCo3). PCo deci-
des to establish a TCo. TCo concludes a physical cash
pool arrangement with Bank Y that sets up the cash
pool. However, the external bank does not apply
enhanced interest rates on the master account of the
CPL. Thus, the interest rates still remain 10% on
deposits and 15% on borrowings.
The total cash pool benefit can be calculated as
follows:
Stand-alone transaction
(without pooling)
Cash
Pooling
Total
cash
pool
benefit
SCo1 SCo2 SCo3 Total
Balance 200 150 –100 250 250
Interest
rate (%) 10% 10% 15% 10%
Interest 20 15 –15 20 25 5
As it can be seen from this example, by the establish-
ment of a physical cash pool, the group can signifi-
cantly enhance its interest income (also in the absence
of any volume effect). In a scenario without pooling,
the group would earn a (consolidated) interest income
of EUR 20. As a result of the pooling, the (consoli-
dated) interest income is increased to EUR 25. Thus,
the total benefit from establishment of the cash pool is
EUR 5 (25–20). In this case, the cash pool benefit is
entirely generated by the netting of the accounts within the
cash pool (netting benefit).
As the example shows, in a situation without a cash
pool, the bank would additionally earn the netting benefit
(of five, see above), i.e. the interest spread between the
lower interest rates on the external cash deposits and the
higher interest rates on the external cash borrowings.
Thus, the ‘netting benefit’ increases or decreases with
the amount of the difference between the interest rates
on cash borrowings and cash deposits.147 In the authors’
opinion, the amount of the interest spread could poten-
tially be linked to the (credit) risk profiles of the bor-
rowers: The better the (credit) risk profiles of the
borrowers, the lower the interest spread (difference in
interest rates between borrowing and lending positions)
and the lower the netting benefit.
Notes
140 PwC, supra n. 1, at 141; Rafiq et al., supra n. 74, s. 3.3.
141 OECD, supra n. 3, para. 94.
142 For a critical discussion on group synergies, see Navarro, The Arm’s Length Standard and Tax Justice, supra. n. 29, 368–74; Wittendorff, supra n. 27, at 342–44.
143 OECD, supra n. 3, para. 125. The OECD defines the netting benefit as the saving made from offsetting debit and credit positions.
144 Russo & Moerer, supra n. 7, at 46; Petruzzi, supra n. 10, at 146; Deloitte Economist Debt Pricing Group, Transfer Pricing Implications of Cash Pooling Structures, 20 Tax Mgmt.
Transfer Pricing Rep. 17 (2012).
145 OECD, supra n. 3, para. 125.
146 PwC, supra n. 1, at 142; OECD, supra n. 92, Comments by BE-VVA, at 92–94; EY, supra n. 109, at 84.
147 For example, if the interest rate on cash borrowings increases to 18%, the netting benefit would increase to eight. By contrast, if the interest rate on cash borrowings
decreases to 12%, netting benefit would decrease to two.
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On the other hand, by the establishment of the phy-
sical cash pool, the external bank deposits and borrow-
ings are replaced by intercompany loans between the
CPL and the cash pool members. The (credit) risks148
of the cash pool borrowers (which could potentially
explain the difference in the interest rates between the
lending and borrowing positions in absence of the cash
pooling arrangement (see above)), are taken over by the
cash pool depositors and the CPL in a physical cash pool.
Consequently, the netting benefit should be earned by
the risk-bearing entities in the cash pool.149 A CPL
which qualifies as an internal bank, and which is, corre-
spondingly, capable of assuming significant (credit) risks,
could also be entitled to earn (at least a portion of) the
netting benefit. By contrast, a CPL that qualifies as
merely a (low-risk) financial service provider and, thus,
could not assume any (credit) risks, should not be
entitled to this benefit. In such a case, the netting
benefit should be attributed to the parties that bear the
(credit) risks of the borrowers, i.e. the cash pool deposi-
tors. Given this – and considering the explanations in
the previous sections – an arm’s length pricing of the
cash pool loans (taking into account the functions per-
formed by the CPL) may, in the authors’ opinion, already
ensure an arm’s length allocation of this benefit.150
6.2 Volume Discount
The establishment of the cash pool may enable the group
to achieve more favourable interest rates in comparison to
the rates that the single cash pool members could obtain
in the absence of the physical cash pool.151 Thus, the cash
pool members (including the CPL) may benefit from
interactions or synergies amongst group members.
However, in practice, the relevant criteria for the applica-
tion of enhanced interest rates (if any) by the external
bank on the master account of the CPL may be multi-
fold.152 Even if one of the possible drivers is the higher
consolidated cash volume in the master account,153 there
may be other criteria with the same or even a higher
contribution to the creation of the value such as the
number of cash pool participants, the creditworthiness of
the cash pool participants, the number of transactions, the
expertise and equity at risk of the CPL etc. Thus, the
relevant criteria (that led to the creation of the value)
must be established by considering the facts and circum-
stances of each case.154 The following simplified example
illustrates the determination of the volume discount:
Unlike the scenario described in the previous chapter,
the external bank applies enhanced interest rates to the master
account of the CPL. Thus, the deposit rate is increased
(from 10%) to 12%. The total cash pool benefit can be
calculated as follows:
Stand-alone transaction
(without pooling)
Cash
Pooling
Total
cash
pool
benefit
SCo1 SCo2 SCo3 Total
Balance 200 150 –100 250 250
Interest
rate (%) 10% 10% 15% 12%
Interest 20 15 –15 20 30 10
The total cash pool benefit amounts to EUR 10 (30–
20). This includes the netting benefit of EUR 5 (see
example above) and the volume discount of EUR 5 (2%
x250).
If a clearly identifiable (and quantifiable) benefit
exists in the physical cash pool after the arm’s length
pricing of the cash pool loans (taking into account the
functions performed by the CPL), that benefit should
be shared among the cash pool members.155 As dis-
cussed above, the cash pool depositors might not be
the only parties entitled to earn this benefit.156 The
mechanism to allocate this benefit should rather reflect
the factors that lead to the creation of the benefit.157
Notes
148 The analysis should consider all significant risks (such as liquidity risks and foreign exchange risk), and, thus should not focus solely on credit risk. EY, supra n. 109, at 84.
149 EY, supra n. 109, at 83 (‘The so called “netting benefit” reflects the risk-related return (liquidity and credit risk premium), not a group synergy. As such, netting benefits
should be allocated to parties assuming such risks’.).
150 PwC, supra n. 1, at 142 (‘As a consequence of application of a method to determine the arm’s length credit and debit interest rates, the cash pool benefit may not necessarily
reside with the CPL. Instead, the cash pool benefit may need to end up with those participants (and potentially the CPL) that (economically) incur the debtor’s risk with
respect to the cash pool’.). Rafiq et al., supra n. 74, s. 3.4.
151 Russo & Moerer, supra n. 7, at 46.
152 PwC, supra n. 1, at 142.
153 OECD, supra n. 92, Comments by BE-VVA, at 92–94.
154 Russo & Moerer, supra n. 7, at 46.
155 The actual low or even negative interest rate environment may marginalize the benefit arising from economies of scale (for more details, see s. 6.). Thus, there could not be
any additional significant benefit that would be shared.
156 PwC, supra n. 1, at 142.
157 OECD, supra n. 17, paras 1.162 (‘If important group synergies exist and can be attributed to deliberate concerted group actions, the benefits of such synergies should
generally be shared by members of the group in proportion to their contribution of the creation of the synergy’.).
Intertax
362
If a thorough functional analysis shows that the con-
solidated cash volume is the main driver of this benefit
in a particular case, this benefit may be shared
between the cash pool depositors.158 The amount of
the cash deposits could then serve as the basis for
deriving a reasonable allocation key. The allocation of
the benefit can also be reflected by an enhancement of
the deposit rates of the depositors.159 Furthermore,
depending on the factors that created the benefit, the
CPL could also be entitled to earn a portion of the
benefit. As a principle, a CPL that qualifies as an
internal bank would likely be entitled to earn a portion
of the benefit, as its contribution to the creation of any
additional value could be significant. By contrast, in a
situation where the CPL assumes only limited functions
(comparable to those of a low-risk financial service
provider), its contribution to the creation of any addi-
tional value could be negligible. Thus, the benefit
might not be attributed to it.
The OECD Discussion Draft on Financial
Transactions clearly highlights that members of a
cash pool would transact with each other only if this
left them no worse off than their next best option.160
This could potentially be tested against the interest
rates offered or applied by external banks on cash
deposits or borrowings (possible next best option of
the cash pool members).161 These interest rates could
therefore be considered as a sort of boundary for the
setting of interest rates and the attribution of the cash
pool benefit to the single cash pool members.162 In
this sense, situations where the same interest rates can
be applied for all participants should rarely occur in
reality.163
7 PHYSICAL CASH POOLING ARRANGEMENTS
IN A NEGATIVE INTEREST RATE
ENVIRONMENT
In the years since the financial crisis, some central
banks – including the European Central Bank – have
established negative interest rate policies.164 The aim
was to encourage business investment and consumer
spending.165 Also, if this objective has partly been
achieved,166 it has created an environment where banks
and savers suffer from low or even negative interest rates.-
167 Banks may even block cash transfers to the accounts
over a target limit.168 In this environment, cash concen-
tration in a single account may be adversely affected. The
negative interest rate could even be higher due to cash
concentration compared to a situation where each group
company individually deposits its cash with its external
bank. Cash concentration in a negative interest rate envir-
onment may therefore create negative synergy effects.
In the past, negative interest rates were considered as a
purely theoretic issue.169 When theory becomes reality,
some economists even fear that the low or negative inter-
est rate environment could cause serious damage to the
business model operated by banks so that banks would
cease to exist in the long term.170 Given the current
environment, it could be foreseeable that under such
circumstance, over the long run the benefits associated
Notes
158 In the Bombardier case, the Court reasoned that, on the basis of the facts available, the main contribution to the cash pool was cash and, correspondingly, the cash pool
depositors are the parties entitled to earn a higher portion of the cash pool benefit. Andresen, Pearson-Wood & Jørgensen, supra n. 3, at 463. Also, the OECD regards the
allocation of the benefit to the depositors as one possible approach. OECD, supra n. 3, para. 129. In the authors’ opinion, this approach could potentially be applied if the
cash pool depositors (and not the CPL) actually bear significant risks related to the cash pooling arrangement and if the source of any volume effect can be explained through
the amount of the cash deposits. On this basis, it could be argued that cash pool depositors are the parties with a higher bargaining power and should be entitled to earn a
higher portion of the cash pool benefit.
159 KPMG, supra n. 109, at 224 (‘A residual profit split approach could make sense, wherein routine functions are first rewarded, and the residual is allocated through a
combination of premiums on deposit rates and discounts on borrowing rates’.).
160 OECD, supra n. 3, para. 123.
161 Ibid., para. 125.
162 One of the proposed OECD approaches comprises the enhancement of the interest rates for all participants. Ibid., para. 127. In the authors’ opinion, the interest rates applied
in the cash pool should be at least as favourable as the interest rates offered or applied by external banks. Thus, the approach to (slightly) enhance the interest rates for all
participants may rather be considered as a principle (than as an independent approach).
163 The OECD regards the equalization of the interest rates as one possible approach. OECD, supra n. 3, para. 128. Assuming that the CPL qualifies as only (low-risk) financial
service provider (such that it does not assume any significant risks) and that all cash pool members have the same or a similar credit profile (up to the level of the group
rating) and contribute in the same manner to the creation of any volume discount, the application of the same interest rate for all participants (up to the level of the interest
rates applied on the master account) could potentially be an option.
164 For example, Denmark, Japan and Switzerland.
165 B. Cœuré, Assessing the Implications of Negative Interest Rates (28 July 2016), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/html/sp160728.en.html (accessed 28 Aug. 2018).
166 Deloitte, CFO Survey (Deloitte 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/de/Documents/finance-transformation/CFO_Frühjahr_2017.pdf (accessed 28 Aug.
2018).
167 IMF, Negative Interest Rate Policies – Initial Experiences and Assessments, IMF Policy Paper 7-8 (Aug. 2018).
168 Deloitte, Treasury & Risk Survey (Deloitte 2016), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/de/Documents/financial-services/FSI_Treasury%20&%20Risk%
20Management%20Survey%202016.pdf (accessed 28 Aug. 2018).
169 D. M. Arseneau, How Would US Banks Fare in a Negative Interest Rate Environment? Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-030 (2017), https://www.federalreserve.
gov/econres/feds/files/2017030pap.pdf (accessed 28 Aug. 2018).
170 N. Irwin, Negative 0.5% Interest Rate: Why People Are Paying to Save, New York Times (13 Feb. 2016).
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with the cash pool may no longer be commercially viable
from the perspective of the single cash pool member.
However, it is imaginable that if independent parties
had established a cash pool they would not immediately
change their behaviour for potential short-term market
fluctuations and would also consider what the future
expectations would be. Thus, short-term negative synergy
effects could potentially be accepted by the cash pool
members if they were independent enterprises.
However, it could also be in the interests of the PCo of
the group to operate a cash pooling system also in the
context of a longer period of negative interest rates. A cash
pool creates transparency and makes it easier to manage
the liquidity requirements and the cash flows along the
finance function of the group. However, enhanced liquid-
ity management at the group level might not lead to
quantifiable advantages for the single cash pool members.
Thus, there could be a risk that tax authorities will
attempt to reclassify the cash pool arrangement into a
service provision to the PCo of the group.171 High cash
deposits in the master account should therefore be
mitigated.
If it is identified that there is a potential effect result-
ing from negative group synergies, the question then
concerns how this should be shared between the parties
in the short or mid-term. The residual cash pool disad-
vantage could potentially be shared based on the same
principles as a cash pool benefit. The mechanism used
should reflect the contribution of the parties to the crea-
tion of the disadvantage. In cases where the CPL qualifies
as an internal bank, it may also bear a portion of the
disadvantage since it may economically bear certain finan-
cial as well as market risks.
8 CONCLUSION
Even if third-party evidence with regard to physical cash
pooling arrangements is sparingly available, the applica-
tion of a transactional arm’s length approach could poten-
tially nevertheless provide arm’s length results:
– intercompany deposits and borrowings: The financial
arrangements arising from the cash movements
between the CPL and the cash pool members can
generally be classified as loans for transfer pricing
purposes. The application of bank interest rates on
the cash pool balances may not be considered at arm’s
length. However, the intercompany loans may be
priced by using a build-up approach (i.e. by applying
a risk premium to a short-term, risk-free base rate).
Nevertheless, the application of this pricing method
does not necessarily facilitate an arm’s length alloca-
tion of the cash pool benefit (such as the volume
discount);
– cash pool guarantees: Guarantees issued in the context of
pooling arrangements lead to a service provision by
the guarantor (e.g. PCo of the group) to the CPL only
if (i) the guarantee is not a substitute for equity
(shareholder activity) and (ii) the CPL benefits from
the guarantee over and above the level of implicit
support. The issuance of cross-guarantees generally
does not justify a separate payment;
– remuneration of the CPL: The CPL should be remuner-
ated according to the function it actually performs.
The financial and functional capability of the CPL to
assume (credit) risks may be the deciding factor for
the attribution of the credit risk. Thus, a CPL that can
be characterized as a (limited-risk) financial service
provider may not be entitled to earn more than a
routine return. By contrast, a CPL that qualifies as
an internal bank may earn more than a routine return.
The arm’s length remuneration for such a CPL may
consist of interest spread between lower interest rates
on cash pool deposits and higher interest rates on cash
pool borrowings; and
– cash pool benefit: The major components of the cash
pool benefit are the netting benefit and the volume
discount. The netting benefit arises from the con-
solidation of the borrowings and deposits within the
cash pool. The arm’s length pricing of the intercom-
pany loans may already lead to an arm’s length
allocation of this benefit. Other factors might have
to be taken into consideration to ensure an arm’s
length allocation of the volume discount (i.e. the
benefit arising from group synergies reflected in
the enhanced interest rates applied on the master
account).
Finally, the low or even negative interest rate environment
could significantly impact the transfer pricing of phy-
sical cash pooling arrangements. The operation of a
physical cash pool in a negative interest rate environ-
ment could create negative group synergies. Thus, the
participation in the physical cash pool may no longer
be commercially viable from the perspective of the
single cash pool member. However, an independent
enterprise would not necessarily leave the cash pool
for potential short-term market fluctuations. The cash
pool disadvantage arising from negative group syner-
gies should be shared between the cash pool members
on the basis of their contribution to the creation of the
disadvantage.
Notes
171 OECD, supra n. 17, paras 1.129–1.131.
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